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Key Points: 
 There have been three major responses to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept in India. 
 Some Indian commentators have embraced the idea of an ‘Indo-Pacific’ region as 
a way to contest established foreign policy traditions, namely non-alignment – 
the rejection of military alliances with any country or group of countries – and 
position India within a counter-hegemonic regional security architecture, which 
is designed to balance China’s growing power. 
 Other commentators reject the concept and argue that non-alignment, and the 
multilateral engagement of a number of countries through existing regional 
institutions, is the best way of achieving India’s strategic objectives. 
 The Indo-Pacific is also starting to appear in official government statements in 
the context of establishing a ‘plural, open and inclusive’ security architecture and 
this approach combines aspects from the positions of both proponents and 
opponents of the Indo-Pacific idea. 
 India’s focus in designing this new architecture is primarily to further its 
domestic economic restructuring through the creation of regional stability, issue-
driven regional governance mechanisms and the cultivation of key trade and 
investment linkages while non-alignment, re-framed as ‘strategic autonomy’, 
remains a core tenet of foreign policy. 
 Understanding the domestic dynamics of India’s desired security architecture in 
the Indo-Pacific, especially its focus on non-traditional security, issue-driven 
cooperative ventures and the maintenance of its strategic autonomy, will be key 
to achieving the broader and deeper level of engagement that Australia seeks 
with India.  
  
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The rapid expansion of trade, investment and production linkages in the area 
spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the shift of economic power from the 
Trans-Atlantic to Asia has given rise to a push by commentators to have the ‘Indo-
Pacific’ region recognised as a single geo-strategic arc. Yet, the concept remains 
politically contested and there has been insufficient attention paid to the geopolitical 
and geoeconomic drivers behind its emergence in particular national contexts. 
Among the most prominent promoters of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ have been commentators 
and state actors in the United States, Australia and India. This policy brief analyses 
the debate on the Indo-Pacific in India, in particular, and suggests that the adoption 
of the Indo-Pacific terminology by Indian officials is a reflection of the dominance of 
domestic economic imperatives in the making of contemporary Indian foreign policy. 
This is at variance with the driving motivation behind the promotion of the term by 
officials in the United States and Australia and suggests that the common adoption of 
the Indo-Pacific concept does not mean a convergence in foreign policy priorities. 
The Indo-Pacific concept has been embraced by members of the US administration – 
it has appeared in speeches by Hilary Clinton and in the Defense Department’s 2012 
strategic plan – and by Australia’s Defense Minister Stephen Smith and its incoming 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Peter Varghese. For the United States, shaping 
the future of the Indo-Pacific region, with regard to security, trade and governance is 
vital to the maintenance of its global leadership and for Australia, the region is one 
that encompasses its key strategic partner, the United States, its top trading partner, 
China, and its preferred regional institution, the East Asia Summit (United States, 
2012; Clinton, 2011; Smith, 2012). For both the United States and Australia, adopting 
and shaping the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a key geo-strategic category helps them negotiate 
the shift of power to Asia in ways that maintain the status quo in relation to existing 
international rules and norms and their positions in the global order as a great power 
and middle power respectively.  
The Indian response to moving from an Asia-Pacific regional conception to an Indo-
Pacific construction reveals rather different preoccupations related to India’s 
economic and political rise.  In India, there have been three major ways of 
approaching the Indo-Pacific idea among commentators and state actors. The first 
approach embraces the notion of the Indo-Pacific in an attempt to bring about a 
change in the direction of Indian foreign policy; the second rejects it as potentially 
being detrimental to India’s foreign policy goals; and the third seeks to appropriate 
Indo-Pacific regionalism to further domestic economic imperatives while upholding 
existing foreign policy traditions. This third approach is appearing in official Indian 
government statements and policies and suggests that although India is adopting the 
‘Indo-Pacific’ idea, its motivations are quite different to those of the Australian and 
United States governments. 
 
Debating the Indo-Pacific 
Several Indian analysts and former diplomats, in particular those who want India to 
abandon its traditional non-aligned stance or who see China as a strategic threat, 
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democracies of the region, like the United States, Australia and Japan, take the lead 
in shaping the economic and security architecture of the region (Chellaney, 2011; 
Singh and Inderfurth, 2011; Mohan, 2011: 4).  
Other commentators however, have expressed skepticism about Indo-Pacific 
regionalism, arguing that adopting the ‘Indo-Pacific’ terminology is unnecessary and 
could mean that India would aligned too closely with American interests and be 
taken on a path which it is not ready to follow (Gupta, 2011). For these 
commentators, the maintenance of India’s autonomy to decide which countries to 
engage with remains integral to its foreign policy, and India’s strategic objectives are 
best met through engagement with countries in the region using forums such as the 
East Asia Summit and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), rather 
than new military partnerships. In this view, ‘the unwitting adoption of a geopolitical 
categorisation might send a wrong, if not false, signal to other countries about India’s 
intentions and actions’ (Gnanagurunathan, 2012).  
These Indian debates on the Indo-Pacific, therefore, reflect a broader foreign policy 
debate in India, which intensified in the 2000s, over the place of non-alignment in 
India’s foreign policy and the nature of India’s relationships with the United States 
and a rising China.  
 
India’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Regionalism 
Despite the contestation over the merits of the Indo-Pacific idea, Indian officials and 
leaders are increasingly using the notion of an Indo-Pacific region in statements and 
speeches. As a former Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, puts it, the US 
acknowledgement of the Pacific and Indian Oceans as an ‘inter-linked geopolitical 
space’ reflects ‘how we [Indians] perceive our own role in the region’ (Saran, 2011).  
In the 1960s when Asian regionalism began to emerge, India rejected membership in 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the basis of concerns that 
ASEAN would primarily function as a US-centred bulwark against communism, which 
would run counter to its non-aligned Cold War stance. Its interest in the Asia-Pacific 
began to increase in the 1980s when East Asia’s economic rise became the object of 
admiration for sections of the bureaucracy and political leadership, and it spiked in 
the 1990s, when India initiated economic reforms to begin the process of 
liberalization. As its economic integration with Asia and beyond escalated, India 
articulated a conception of an ‘extended neighbourhood’ spanning the ‘countries in 
the ASEAN - Pacific region, Central Asia, the Gulf, West Asia and North Africa, and the 
Indian Ocean Rim’, which is neatly aligned with an Indo-Pacific regional construction 
(India, 1999).   
The ‘Indo-Pacific’ terminology is now starting to appear in official government 
statements in the context of establishing a ‘plural, inclusive and open security 
architecture in the Indo-Pacific’ (Menon, 2012). The idea of an ‘open security 
architecture’ is one that has been promoted by state actors in the United States, 
Japan and Australia, however, the motives for using the concept and its meanings 
tend to be distinctive and dependent on the national context (Tow and Taylor, 2010). 
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India to maintain established foreign policy tenets, namely non-alignment, which has 
been recast as ‘strategic autonomy’ in official discourse, and which creates a stable 
regional environment that is conducive to the cultivation of key trade and investment 
linkages for India’s domestic economic development (Chacko, 2012). 
While India supports established regional groupings like ASEAN and the East Asia 
Summit and established norms related to the freedom of navigation and the peaceful 
settlement of maritime disputes in accordance with international law, its focus in the 
Indo-Pacific is not confined to a top-down structure built on multilateral institutions 
or alliances but appears to be taking the form of bottom-up, issue-driven regional 
cooperative arrangements together with a broad collection of ‘strategic partnerships’ 
with individual countries (Mathai, 2012).  
India’s key areas of concern when it comes to creating and participating in regional 
governance arrangements are being determined by the imperatives of its domestic 
economic development and the increasingly important role that growing trade, 
investment and production linkages across the Indo-Pacific play in this economic 
restructuring. India’s national security advisor, Shivshankar Menon, has cited security 
challenges from non-traditional sources as requiring particular attention. This is 
because ‘the issues that we face in dealing with the changes in Asia are different 
from those that we see in historical analogies of rising powers in the past’ (Menon, 
2011). Traditional security problems, like border issues and inter-state conflict, while 
‘real and worrying’, have been adequately managed and have ‘not prevented the 
stupendous transformation that has resulted in the accumulation of power and 
wealth in large parts of Asia’ (Menon, 2011). Problems of regional instability from 
non-traditional sources, such as weak state capacity in key parts of the Indo-Pacific, 
pose a significant challenge to India’s economic development. 
For instance, the importance of India’s maritime trade in resources across both the 
Indian and western Pacific Oceans has resulted in a focus on securing sea-lanes and 
maritime governance through regional initiatives such as the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 
which involves the Indian navy and coast guard. India also contributes to the African 
Union Mission in Somalia and has begun bilateral and trilateral naval coordination 
and patrolling with countries in Asia – namely China and Japan – and in Africa, in 
particular, Kenya, Madagascar and the Seychelles. As its trade in resources, 
investment and commercial links with African countries grow more important, India’s 
focus on cooperative partnerships with regional organisations in Africa are 
deepening. Arrangements for cooperation in agriculture, agri-business and 
infrastructure, also key areas of economic restructuring in both Africa and India, 
involves collaborative projects between African Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs), the African Union’s New Partnerships for African Development (NEPAD) and 
India’s Exim Bank and Indian government agencies and departments. 
The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC), which was established in 1997 to bring together countries in South and 
Southeast Asia, namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Nepal, has also seen a flurry of activity recently, leading to the release of a regional 
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Mekong-Ganga initiative, launched in 2000 and involving India, Thailand, Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has recently expanded its ambit to include trade, 
investment, energy, food, health and highway connectivity. To be sure, these are all 
incipient initiatives but it is significant that India is expending both diplomatic and 
financial resources to reinvigorating them at this point in time, and this gives an 
indication of its current priorities and the forms of regional governance it currently 
favours. 
 
Conclusion  
Commentary in India on the emerging notion of an Indo-Pacific region has reflected 
broader debates on the direction of Indian foreign policy. Quite separate to this 
debate on the merits of adopting an Indo-Pacific regional construction, however, 
there is an emerging vision of the Indo-Pacific in Indian foreign policy. Rather than 
promoting a top-down institutionalised regional security architecture, recent official 
statements and actions suggest that India is seeking to maintain its strategic 
autonomy and fashion a bottom-up, issue-driven set of regional governance 
mechanisms that reflect the demands of its domestic economic restructuring, and 
the regional challenges that it regards to be most potentially disruptive to its 
economic development.  
Rather than bringing India closer to the strategic outlooks of Australia and the United 
States, the adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept by Indian officials serves to highlight 
continuing divergences. In particular, while Australia and the United States are 
wedded to shaping the Indo-Pacific in ways that maintain existing international rules 
and norms so that the United States remains the world’s foremost rule-maker, the 
domestic economic imperatives currently driving India’s foreign policy and India’s 
continuing adherence to the principle of strategic autonomy implies that no such 
commitment by India to the status quo can be assured. 
The Australian Government’s recent Australia in the Asian Century White Paper 
highlighted India as one of the countries with which Australia should have a broader 
and deeper engagement. Understanding the domestic dynamics of India’s desire for 
a plural and inclusive security architecture in the Indo-Pacific – and, in particular, its 
focus on non-traditional security and issue-driven cooperative ventures – rather than 
assuming that India will essentially share Australian and American preoccupations in 
the region, will be key to achieving a more substantial level of engagement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“India is seeking to 
maintain its strategic 
autonomy and fashion 
a bottom-up, issue-
driven set of regional 
governance 
mechanisms that 
reflect the demands of 
its domestic economic 
restructuring and the 
regional challenges 
that it regards to be 
most potentially 
disruptive to its 
economic 
development.” 
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IPGRC Research Mission 
A primary focus of our research agenda is on political dynamics of governance and 
institutional innovations in the provision of public goods and regulation especially as it 
relates to economic and social development in the region.  
This will address issues relating to the organisation of markets and politics, and their 
effectiveness and fairness in addressing complex economic and social problems. It will also 
include an examination of the transformations of political organisation and authority at 
various scales – global, national, and regional – which have a bearing on the complex 
multilevel governance of the delivery of public goods and regulations.  
The centre has a particular focus on the global and regional challenges arising from the 
shifting tectonic plates of economic and political power to the Indo-Pacific region. 
 
